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Fourth Amendment: A Second-Class Constitutional
Right for the Purpose of Federal Habeas Corpus:

Stone v. Powell

On February 17, 1968, Lloyd Powell and three persons entered a liquor
store in California. Powell became involved in an altercation with the
store manager and, in the scuffle, shot and killed the manager's wife.
Some ten hours later, an officer of the Henderson, Nevada, police department arrested Powell for violation of the Henderson vagrancy ordinance.' The search incident to Powell's arrest produced a thirty-eight
caliber revolver with six expended cartridges in the cylinder. Powell was
extradited to California and convicted of second-degree murder in the
Superior Court of San Bernadino County. On a motion to suppress, the
trial court rejected Powell's argument that the evidence should be excluded because of its discovery pursuant to arrest under an unconstitutional vagrancy ordinance. On appeal to the California District Court
of Appeals, the conviction was affirmed. The court concluded that the
error in admitting the seized evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.2 Habeas corpus relief was denied by the California Supreme
Court.
In August 1971, Powell filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
He argued that he had been unlawfully arrested because the vagrancy
ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, that the evidence
which led to his conviction should have been excluded. The district court
held, however, that even if the statute was unconstitutional, the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule did not require the exclusion from
1. The ordinance provides: "Every person is a vagrant who: (I) Loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place without apparent reason or business; and
(2) who refuses to identify himself and to account for his presence when asked by any
police officer to do so; (3) if surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a
reasonable man that the public safety demands such identification."

2. The court of appeals relied on the harmless error rule of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967): "We conclude that there may-be some constitutional errors
which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they
may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the

automatic reversal of the conviction."
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evidence of the fruits of a search incident to an otherwise valid arrest.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed The court
concluded: "the exclusion of the evidence would deter legislators from
enacting unconstitutional statutes."' 5 The United States Supreme Court
reversed and held: "where the State had provided an opportunity for full
and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may
not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence
obtained in an unconstitutional search-and-seizure was introduced at his
trial." 6

1. SCOPE OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
The Supreme Court in Powell noted: "the authority of the federal
courts to issue the writ of habeas corpus was established by the Judiciary
Act of 1789."1 The scope of the "Great Writ" was limited to inquiries
into the jurisdiction of tribunals passing sentence over prisoners in custody of the United States." In 186, the writ's scope was expanded to
include state prisoners.' With this expansion, the federal courts became
authorized to give relief where a state or federal prisoner-was restrained
of liberty in violation of the Constitution, a treaty, or a law of the
United States. However, the limitation as to the jurisdiction of the
sentencing court persisted; 0 "[a]nd, although the concept of 'jurisdiction' was subjected to considerable strain as the substantive scope of
3. See Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93, 94 (9th Cir. 1974) (discussing the California
Court of Appeals holding).
4. See Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974).
5. Id. at 98.
6. Stone v. Powell, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3052 (1976). Stone v. Powell was considered

with Warden v. Rice on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit. Warden concerned respondent's allegation of an unconstitutional ordinance;
however, both are of identical issue.
7. Id. at 3042.
8. id.
9. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, c.28, § 1, 14 STAT. 385 (1867).
10. See In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891) (no federal habeas corpus review of an
adverse decision if all possible state appeals have not been made); In re Rahrer, 140

U.S. 545 (1891) (habeas corpus only allowed for determination of jurisdiction of the
state court regarding police powers); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272 (1895) (mere
error in the conduct of a trial cannot be made the basis of jurisdiction in a court of the
United States to review proceedings upon writ of habeas corpus); Pettibone v. Nichols,
203 U.S. 192 (1906) (state prisoners held in custody of the state, charged with state
criminal laws, will be left to stand trial there and may not be discharged by way of
habeas corpus).
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the writ was expanded, this expansion was limited to only a few classes
of cases."'"
This jurisdictional limitation was relaxed when the Court held in
Frank v. Mangum 2 that if a habeas corpus court found that the State
had failed to provide an adequate corrective process for a full and fair
litigation of federal claims, the court could determine whether the detention was lawful, whether or not jurisdictional.
Brown v. Allen" and Daniels v. Allen"4 expanded the scope of the
writ still further. These cases involved state prisoners who applied for
federal habeas corpus relief, claiming that the trial courts incorrectly
denied motions to quash their indictments because of alleged discrimination in the selection of grand jurors. The claimants were found to be
entitled to a full reconsideration of the constitutional isssues including
a hearing in the federal district court, although the state supreme court
had rejected these claims.
A final barrier to the broad collateral re-examination of state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus proceedings was removed in
Fay v. Noia.5 Fay removed the barrier created by Daniels, in which
habeas relief was refused because papers were not timely filed. Fay
narrowly restricted the circumstances in which a federal court may
refuse to consider the merits of federal constitutional claims. The Court
noted that "[d]iscretion is implicit in the statutory command that the
judge . . . 'dispose of the matter as law and justice require."'"6
The question arising after Fay was whether there should be collateral re-examination of state criminal convictions by way of habeas corpus for all alleged constitutional violations.
In Kaufman v. United States,17 the Court held that a claim of an
unconstitutional search-and-seizure was cognizable in a 28 U.S.C. §
2255 proceeding or modern post-conviction procedure."6 In the
11. 96 S.Ct. at 3042. The expansion occurred primarily with regard to convictions
based on assertedly unconstitutional statutes or detentions based upon an allegedly
illegal sentence. Id. n. 8.
12. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
13. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
14. 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (a companion case to Brown v. Allen).
15. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
16. Id. at 438.
17. 394 U.S. 217, 231 (1969).

18. This procedure is commonly equated with habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. §
2255 (1970).
Federal custody: remedies on motion attacking sentence. A prisoner in custody
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Kaufman case, the Supreme Court for the first time suggested that the
scope of federal collateral review included state convictions involving
Fourth Amendment violations. However, the instant case rejected the
holding and dictum of Kaufman concerning the applicability of the
exclusionary rule in federal habeas corpus review of the state court
decisions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceedings. 9
The Supreme Court's reasons for rejecting Kaufman are two-fold.
First, the Court noted that a substantial majority of the federal courts
of appeal, prior to Kaufman, had concluded that collateral review of
search-and-seizure claims was inappropriate on motions filed by federal
prisoners under the modern post-conviction procedure." The primary
rationale in support of this contention was that Fourth Amendment
violations are different in kind from denials of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights in that "claims of illegal search-and-seizure do not impugn
the integrity of the fact finding process or challenge evidence as inherently unreliable."'" Therefore, the Court concluded that because Fourth
Amendment violations differ from Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations there should be a re-examination of the scope of federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction, and that such review should be permitted only when
the petitioner was not accorded a full and fair opportunity to raise and
adjudicate the constitutional issue in state court. Second, the Court reunder sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be
released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the U.S., or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose
such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by
law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. A motion for such
relief may be made at any time. Unless the motion and the files and records of
the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall
cause notice thereof to be served upon the U.S. attorney, grant a prompt hearing
thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law
with respect thereto. If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without
jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise
open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of
the constitutional rights of the prisoneras to render the judgment vulnerable to
collateralattack [emphasis added], the court shall set aside the judgment and shall
discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the
sentence as may appear appropriate.
19. 96 S.Ct. at 3045, n. 16. Federal statutory habeas corpus proceedings as it
applies to state prisoners is described in 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
20. See, e.g.. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
21. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. at 224 (1969).
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evaluated the exclusionary rule, and questioned whether its justification
(deterrence of police misconduct) requires collateral review of Fourth
Amendment claims."
2.

HISTORY AND SCOPE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

The Fourth Amendment assures the "right of the people to be
*securein their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures.""
In an attempt to implement this guarantee, the judicial system
created the exclusionary rule.u Prior to Weeks v. United States,2 there
existed no real barrier to the introduction of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment in criminal proceedings. 21 Weeks established that a defendant could petition before trial for the return of
property secured through an illegal search and seizure conducted by
federal authorities.
The next step in the evolition of the exclusionary rule was the
exclusion of illegally seized evidence and its fruits from state judicial
proceedings.Y Wolf v. Colorado2l applied the Fourth Amendment to the
states by interpreting it as "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and
as such enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause." But the Court refused to impose the rule as
a mandatory method of enforcement by state courts, and left them free
to adopt or reject it. Finally, the exclusionary rule was held applicable
to the states in Mapp v. Ohio.2 '
22. Stone v. Powell, 96 S.Ct. at 3047.
23. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
24. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961). "It meant [the exclusionary rule], quite simply, that conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced
confessions.

. .

should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts.

. .

and that

such evidence shall not be used at all.")
25. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
26. 96 S.Ct. at 3046. See also Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904). "The
fact that papers.

. .

may have been illegally taken.

. .

is not a valid objection to their

admissibility."; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
27. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) (an unconstitutional seizure
of papers of the accused creates a duty on the trial court to entertain objection to their
admission); cf. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (the
Fourth Amendment protects corporations and its officers from compulsory production
of corporate books and papers when the information which formed the basis of the
warrant was obtained through an unconstitutional search and seizure.
28. 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
29. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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WHETHER THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE REQUIRES
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF

Over the years, courts have formulated three justifications for the
exclusionary rule. One justification utilized by the courts was that the
accused, through the Fourth Amendment, possessed a constitutional
right to exclude evidence obtained as a result of unlawful searches and
seizures.30 The second justification was based upon the so-called
"judicial integrity theory." This theory required the courts to exclude
evidence obtained by the government's "unclean hands" in order that
the courts not be a party to a constitutional violation." The third
rationale is the deterrence theory, which was designed to remove the
incentive for unlawful police searches by excluding evidence from use
at trial. As stated in United States v. Calandra:
[The exclusionary rule]. . . is not calculated to redress the injury to the
privacy of the victim of the search or seizure, for any reparation comes
too late. The rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect. 3
Powell demonstrated that the courts have limited the justification
of the exclusionary rule solely to the police deterrence theory., The
Court then proceeded to impose further limitations on the rule, stating
that the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the
introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or for the
benefit of all persons.u It has not been held applicable to grand jury
proceedings, nor has it been applied to evidence impeaching the credibil30. Note, The Fourth Amendment ExclusionaryRule: Past, Present,No Future.
12 AM. CRIM. LAW REV., 507, 508 (1975). Cf. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
355-67 (1974). "[Mly dissent rejected the premise that an individual has no constitutional right to have unconstitutionally seized evidence excluded from all use by the
government. ..."

31.

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,483-84(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-

ing).
32. 414 U.S. at 348 (1974).
33. 96 S.Ct. at 3055.
34. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973) (no standing to contest
admission of evidence seized under defective warrant since there was no legitimate
expectation of privacy in the premises searched or the goods seized): Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (Fourth Amendment violation may only be urged
by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, and not those aggrieved solely
by the introduction of damaging evidence).
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ity of a defendant who has testified in his own defense.5 A further
limitation has been the requirement of standing."
After delineating the exclusionary rule's historical limitations, the
Court applied a cost/benefit analysis and concluded that the costs of the
rule were not outweighed by its benefits." In its analysis, the Court
considered the rule's present justification-police deterrence-and ignored the theories of personal private right and judicial integrity.
The so-called costs or disadvantages of the exclusionary rule which
the Court noted are:
[F]ocus of the trial and attention of the participants therein is diverted
from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be the central
concern in a criminal proceeding. . . . [t]he physical evidence sought to
be excluded is typically reliable and often the most probative information
bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant; and. . . if applied
indiscriminately, it may well have the opposite effect of generating disrespect for the law and administration of justice."
After stating what the Court believed to be the exclusionary rule's
severe costs, the Court discussed its possible advantages and deemed
them relatively insignificant:
There is no reason to believe, however, that the educative effect of the
exclusionary rule would be appreciably diminished if search-and-seizure
claims could not be raised in federal habeas review of state convictions.
Nor is there any reason to assume that any specific disincentive already
created by the risk of exclusion of evidence at trial or the reversal of
convictions on direct review would be enhanced if there were the further
risk that a conviction obtained in state court and affirmed on direct
often occurring
review might be overturned in collateral proceedings
3
years after the incarceration of the defendant.
35. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491-93 (1963).
36. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (standing has been
found to exist only when the government attempts to use illegally obtained evidence to
incriminate the victim of the illegal search, as distinguished from one who claims
prejudice only through the use of the evidence gathered as a consequence of a search
directed at someone else).
37. 96 S.Ct. at 3051.
38. Id. at 3049-50.
39. Id. at 3051. The majority also discussed the disadvantages of granting habeas
corpus: (1) intrusions on values important to our system of government, such as utilization of limited judicial resources; (2) the necessity of finality in criminal trials; and
(3) the minimization of friction between federal and state systems of justice.
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According to the Court, therefore, the costs outweighed any benefits derived through collateral review of alleged Fourth Amendment
violations.
4.

RAMIFICATIONS OF THE DECISION

There are a few areas of uncertainty created by the Court's opinion.
Though the Court has limited its opportunity to hear Fourth Amendment claims by state prisoners in federal collateral proceedings, it has
not relinquished its right to do so. In explaining the distinction, the
Court claimed: "Our decision does not mean that the federal court lacks
jurisdiction over such a claim, but only that the application of the rule
is limited to eases in which there has been both a showing [of a denial
of opportunity
for full and fair litigation] and a Fourth Amendment
40
violation.'
In light of the Supreme Court's intention to retain jurisdiction over
such claims, an ambiguity arises. What does a "full and fair opportunity
to litigate" mean, and how will the Court interpret it?
The Court in Powell cited the case of Townsend v. Sain. 1 In
Townsend, the Court described six criteria which would require a federal district court to hold a separate evidentiary hearing in the case of
collateral review of a state or federal conviction. It held:
[A] federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to a habeas applicant
under the following circumstances: If (1) the merits of the factual dispute
were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination
is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding
procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full
and fair hearing; (4) there is substantial allegation of newly discovered
evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the
state court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier2
of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing.
The Court continued:
[T]here cannot be the semblance of a full and fair hearing unless the state
court actually reached and decided the issues of fact tendered by the
defendant."
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 3052, n. 37.
372 U.S. 293 (1963).
Id. at 313.
Id. at 313-14.
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Therefore, Townsend seemed to set forth the general guidelines which
determine whether a federal district court should hold a hearing on
habeas corpus review for want of a proper hearing on the merits at the
state level. However, even in Townsend, which was decided in 1963, the
Court noted: "if the prior state hearing occurred in the original trial
-for example, on a motion to suppress allegedly unlawful evidence-it
will usually be proper to assume that the claim was rejected on the
merits.""
Thus, the two requisites for collateral review under Powell are:
(1) the showing of a denial of a full and fair opportunity to litigate,
which the Court in Townsend assumed will be decided on the merits in
a motion to suppress; and (2) a Fourth Amendment violation. It therefore appears likely that there will be little future occasion for collateral
review of Fourth Amendment violations involving state prisoners, so
long as the state courts rule on the defendant's motion to suppress.
Justice Brennan, in his lengthy dissent, recognized the costs and
benefits derived from the exclusionary rule and its abolishment which
the majority of the Court did not figure into their original equation.'"
First, Brennan stated: "The denigration of constitutional guarantees and constitutionally mandated procedures, relegated by the Court
to the status of mere utilitarian tools, must appall citizens taught to
expect judicial respect."" To do away with federal habeas relief by using
the exclusionary rule's supposed sole justification, police deterrence, and
then merely weighing costs versus benefits, such as the majority of the
Court has done, defeats important constitutional safeguards.
Second, "[c]onventional notions of finality in criminal litigation
cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal
constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the
44. Id. at 314.
45. 96 S.Ct. at 3071-72, where White, J., in his dissenting opinion, pointed out:
Two confederates in crime, Smith and Jones, are tried separately for a state crime
and convicted on the very same evidence, including evidence seized incident to
their arrest allegedly made without probable cause. .

.

.Their convictions are

affirmed by the State's highest court. Smith does not petition for certiorari [but
Jones does and is granted it. His conviction is reversed]. .

.

.Smith then files

for petition for federal habeas corpus. He makes no claim that he did not have a
full and fair hearing in the state courts, but asserts his Fourth Amendment claim
had been erroneously decided and that he is being held in violation of the Federal
Constitution. .

.

.Smith's petition would be dismissed, and he would spend his

life in prison while his colleague is a free man.
46. Id. at 3065.
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fullest opportunity for plenary federal review." 7
Third, he emphasized "the need for federal review of federal constitutional claims because of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.""8
Fourth, judicial integrity, a rationale which the majority deemphasized as a justification for the exclusionary rule, should be considered a primary rationale, according to Brennan. Citing Justice Holmes,
Brennan said: "It is

. .

.a less evil that some criminals should escape

than that the government should play an ignoble part."' Moreover,
Brennan cited Brown v. A llenY' which noted: "it is an abuse to deal too
casually and too lightly with rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, even though they involve limitations upon state power and may be
invoked by those morally unworthy."
Fifth, Brennan dealt with the majority's concern with comity and
friction between federal and state tribunals. He pointed out that in the
interest of comity, to lessen federal-state friction, collateral review requires exhaustion of state remedies and not lack of power." Therefore,
collateral review dictates that federal habeas corpus review be delayed
pending initial state court determination. But the Court noted: "[Dielay
only was the price, else a rule of timing would become a rule circumscribing the power of the federal courts on habeas, in defiance of unmistakable congressional intent." 52
Finally, Brennan demonstrated how the majority's opinion lacks a
constitutional basis for denying federal habeas corpus relief to state
prisoners when Fourth Amendment violations are involved. He writes:
The Court adheres to the holding of Mapp that the Constitution
required exclusion of the evidence admitted at respondents' trials. However, the Court holds that the Constitution does not require that respondents be accorded habeas relief if they were accorded an opportunity for
full and fair litigation of the Fourth Amendment claims in state courts.
Yet once the Constitution was interpreted by Mapp to require exclusion
of certain evidence at trial, the Constitution became irrelevant to the
manner in which the constitutional right was to be enforced in the federal
47. Stone v. Powell, 96 S.Ct. at 3063, citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424
(1963).
48. 96 S.Ct. at 3067.
49. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928).
50. 344 U.S. 443 (1953); cf Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 432; England v. Medical
Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-17 (1964).
51. 96 S.Ct. at 3060.
52. 96 S.Ct. at 3060, n. 10; Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 420 (1963).
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courts; that inquiry is only a matter of respecting Congress' allocation
of federal judicial power between this Court's appellate jurisdiction and
a federal district court's habeas jurisdiction. Indeed, by conceding that
today's decision does not mean that the federal district court lacks jurisdiction over respondents' claims, the Court admits that respondents have
sufficiently alleged that they are in custody in violation of the Constitution within the meaning of § 2254 and that there is no constitutional
rationale for today's holding.53
Justice Brennan concluded by stating:
[Als a practical matter the only result of today's holding will be that
denials by the state prisoners of violations of their Fourth Amendment
rights will go unreviewed by a federal tribunal. I fear that the same
treatment ultimately will be accorded state prisoners' claims of violations
of other constitutional rights; thus, the potential ramifications of this case
for federal habeas jurisdiction generally are ominous."
5.

CONCLUSION

The holding presented in Stone v. Powell can either become as
frightening as Justice Brennan perceives or as merely procedural as
Justice Powell portrays.u Whether personal rights and liberties are to
be curtailed in the future or whether state courts will sufficiently uphold
Fourth Amendment constitutional rights will be determined only in
future court decisions.
Michael Wayne Ullman
53. 96 S.Ct. at 3084.
54. 96 S.Ct. at 3071 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. "In sum, we hold only that a federal court need not apply the exclusionary
rule on habeas review of a Fourth Amendment claim absent a showing that the state
prisoner was denied an opportunity for a full and fair litigation of that claim at trial
and on direct review ... we emphasize the minimal utility of the rule." 96 S.Ct. at
3052, n. 37.
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